







PIAGET, BUNGE, AND THE FUTURE OF GENERAL PHILOSO-
PHY IN LATIN AMERICA 
 
Tristan Guillermo Torriani1 
Abstract 
The current state of Philosophy and the Humanities is widely acknowledged to 
be endangered. This historical essay addresses epistemological reasons and ins-
titutional causes of this malaise in light of Piaget’s and Bunge’s scientistic critique 
of humanistic approaches. As my discussion is sensitive to concrete social reali-
ties (or territorialized), I limit myself to the Latin American context, which was 
highly influenced by Catholicism, Positivism and Marxism. Although Piaget and 
Bunge are justified in claiming that Philosophy disassociated from Science is too 
speculative, Bunge’s  proposal of reconstructing it as a holistic system is unviable 
because it goes way beyond a normal research program, as if it were a supersci-
ence. However, a closer examination of Piaget’s and Bunge’s practice suggests a 
second, more modest possibility: Analytical Philosophy can focus on methodo-
logical, conceptual and ethical problems within specific scientific disciplines. 
This prevents the outright extinction of Philosophy, which could in itself be con-
ceptually incoherent besides being unwise, and instead proposes its subordina-
tion, articulation, fragmentation and diaspora among the Sciences. A third option 
would be historical-theoretical reconstruction, which Piaget also accepted as an 
honorable exit. In addition, curricular and institutional changes would be needed 
in undergraduate education for Philosophy students to acquire at least basic sci-
entific training that would break what Piaget described as the spell of holistic 
reflection (holology). 
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A condição atual da Filosofia e das Humanidades é amplamente reconhecido 
como estando ameaçada. Neste ensaio histórico procura-se tratar das razões epis-
temológicas e das causas institucionais deste mal-estar à luz da crítica cientificista 
de Piaget e Bunge das abordagens humanísticas. Por ser sensível à realidade so-
cial concreta (territorialização), esta discussão se atem ao contexto latino-ameri-
cano, fortemente influenciado pelo Catolicismo,  Positivismo e Marxismo. Em-
bora Piaget e Bunge estejam justificados em alegar que a Filosofia desassociada 
da Ciência seja especulativa demais, a proposta bungeana de reconstrui-la como 
um sistema holístico é inviável porque ultrapassa um programa de pesquisa nor-
mal, como se fosse uma superciência. Porém, um exame mais próximo da prática 
de Piaget e Bunge sugere uma segunda, mais modesta possibilidade: a Filosofia 
Analítica pode focar em problemas metodológicos, conceituais e éticos no inte-
rior de disciplinas científicas específicas. Isto evitaria a extinção total da Filosofia, 
o que poderia ser em si mesmo conceitualmente incoerente além de ser desacon-
selhável e, no lugar disso, sugere a sua subordinação, articulação, fragmentação 
e diáspora entre as ciências. Uma terceira opção seria a reconstrução histórico-
teórica, que Piaget também aceitava como uma saída honrosa. Além disso, mu-
danças curriculares e institucionais seriam necessárias na formação de graduação 
em Filosofia para que os alunos adquiram pelo menos um treino científico básico 
que romperia com o que Piaget percebia como o encanto da reflexão holística 
(holologia). 
Palavras chave: Piaget, J.; Bunge, M.; Metafilosofia; Cientificismo; América La-
tina.   
 
Introduction 
After the unprecedented violence of World War II, one would have 
expected studies of the human condition in a historical, cultural, linguistic and 
philosophical perspective to be recognized as more than ever necessary. Howe-








disconnect between the sciences and the humanities while inaugurating the lat-
ter’s legitimation crisis. Sixty years later, the situation does not seem to have im-
proved much, if at all. As far as Latin America was concerned, the 1960s were 
defined by military regimes that sought to counter Soviet influence and the dis-
semination of Communist ideology. Local oligarchies had scarce interest in pro-
viding education that would make citizens aware of other ways of organizing 
society. In Brazil, Paulo Freire’s efforts were interrupted after the 1964 coup d’état 
by imprisonment and later exile in Bolivia and Chile. At the University of São 
Paulo, which had been founded thirty years earlier, professors, employees and 
students alike had to live under the threat of imprisonment and torture, while 
several preferred to leave the country. In Argentina, the centenarian Mario Bunge 
(1919 - ) had already been arrested by Perón for two weeks in 1951 when he de-
cided to emigrate in 1963. This shared experience of military repression has left 
deep scars in the Latin American academic community. Mauricio Macri’s election 
in 2015, Dilma Rousseff’s impeachment in 2016, Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva’s ar-
rest in 2018, and the recent election of Jair Messias Bolsonaro are understandably 
regarded as part of a new wave of right-wing populism in the region. 
 
It is important to point out that in spite of these conditions of political 
instability, repression and inequality, Latin American academics did not suc-
cumb to the temptation of adopting a self-pitying victimological attitude, but 
have struggled to establish solid institutions of higher learning that serve increa-
singly diverse local constituencies and contribute to social and economic deve-
lopment. In Philosophy, the area of the Humanities that is relevant to this essay, 
there are numerous departments with distinguished scholars and excellent un-








and History of Philosophy, but also in Logic and Analytic Philosophy. This ins-
titutional achievement should be celebrated in a region that still struggles to over-
come illiteracy. However, this notwithstanding, Piaget and Bunge detected se-
vere theoretical difficulties in Philosophy (as well as in the Humanities in gene-
ral) that need to be addressed because they call into question the very purpose of 
the discipline and suggest a need for deep reform. In his book Insights and Illusi-
ons of Philosophy, Piaget wrote candidly about his déconversion and his trouble in 
extricating himself from theoretical mistakes and institutional conventions of the 
francophone academic world of his time.2 Bunge has castigated a wide range of 
philosophers and scientists for their lack of rigor, both logical and moral. Often, 
much of what they have to say about Philosophy may strike readers as being 
overly negative and it would be regrettable if their critique were taken amiss, as 
if they were not sensitive to the hardship of Latin American reality. Any cursory 
reading of their biographies should be enough to dispel this misunderstanding. 
Throughout his long and productive life, Bunge has always stayed in touch with 
his native Argentina.  
The first section of this essay proposes a preliminary definition of Ge-
neral Philosophy and provides some historical context. In the second section, Pi-
aget's critique of General Philosophy is reconstructed as a two-tiered argument 
that is both epistemological and psycholinguistic. In the third section, Bunge’s 
outstanding contribution is given consideration as a model for General Philoso-
phy because it combines systematic organization with analytic detail. However, 
all in all, the cases of Piaget and Bunge do not seem favorable to General Philo-
sophy, in spite of the enormous range of their own work. Perhaps this paradox 
                                                 
2 I agree with the reviewers of this paper that Piaget's discussion of Philosophy goes way beyond the single 
work I am mentioning here and apologize for this limitation. It is indeed necessary to acknowledge that 
the centrality of Genetic Epistemology for Piaget's project implies a much wider range of possible theore-








can be explained because both are not only philosophers, but also superscientists 
(psychologist and physicist respectively) and their philosophies are powered by 
their scientific work. They agree that philosophers need scientific training, so 
they do not reject General Philosophy per se, but only if it is disconnected from 
Science.   
The Problem of General Philosophy 
In Plato’s Gorgias (484c - 486d), Callicles entreats Socrates to not com-
pletely loose contact with social reality by pursuing philosophical inquiries to 
extreme detail. With a sense of foreboding, he warns Socrates that he would be 
defenseless if brought to court on false charges. In Callicles’ considered opinion, 
the study of Philosophy was indeed a necessary preparatory part of education, 
and advisable at an earlier age, but only for a definite period, not as a lifelong 
pursuit.  
The ancient Greeks used several terms related to wisdom: sage 
(σοφός), payed itinerant teacher or sophist (σοφιστής), and unpaid lover of wis-
dom or philosopher (φιλόσοφος). Plato’s concern with the possible contamina-
tion of education and research by financial interest still resonates with us today, 
as it did for J.-J. Rousseau, F. Schiller and A. Schopenhauer. The latter’s well-
known excoriation of university professors as persons who live not for Philoso-
phy, but on it cannot be simply brushed aside. Strictly speaking, the notion of a 
“paid philosopher” is as contradictory as that of a square circle. Perhaps there 
should be no reason to take offense at applying the term ‘Sophistics’ to currently 
financed Philosophy and Science.  
Plato’s concern is even more justified when we consider how econo-
mic interest can transmogrify into ideologies and belief systems (“money talks”). 








of values related to self-reflection. W. Mays’ translation of ‘sagesse’ as insight mis-
ses the semantic link Piaget wanted to maintain between Philosophy and wis-
dom, but it also overlooks the possibility of relating sagesse to Sophistics. As far 
as Bunge is concerned, he uses the Spanish term ‘macaneador’ to denounce char-
latans, but not ‘sophist’ in a negative sense.  
Historically, we can say that General Philosophy began as an appro-
ach, namely, an argumentative engagement with philosophical problems that re-
sorts freely to any subfields when needed, yet without attempting to provide a 
wide-ranging philosophical system. Plato’s dialogues were the perfect literary 
model for giving birth to General Philosophy, later followed by the genre inspi-
red by Aristotle’s systematic lectures and treatises, which tend to become rather 
technical and scientific. In its original spirit, General Philosophy was meant to 
remain as close as possible to everyday language, while performing work that 
could not be achieved by mere common sense. In accordance with Plato’s concern 
with the possibility of teaching virtue and acquiring wisdom, General Philoso-
phy could be regarded as a practical subject in the Kantian sense, concerned with 
the development of personal moral-historical conscience. It is important to admit 
that in the current post-modern dispensation General Philosophy cannot be com-
pletely separated from issues that many consider ideological.  
Stated simply, the problem of General Philosophy is that it resists fra-
gmentation and specialization because it tries to be the last refuge of a holistic 
approach to the Big Questions. It is this claim to universality that makes General 
Philosophy seem special. Once this quest for completeness is given up, speciali-
zation in Philosophy ceases to be much different from that in any other particular 
science. This will be all the more so if one follows the thesis that Philosophy is 
continuous with Science, and less so if one takes the position that Philosophy is 








what W. Sellars called the manifest image (or our phenomenological self-unders-
tanding).  
Should General Philosophy be simply extinguished? This question 
seems to admit only two solutions, either yes or no. If yes, there is no hope for a 
philosophical discipline that transcends specialized interests. In the medical area, 
for instance, generalists are becoming increasingly hard to find. In the Humani-
ties, however, specialization may become dysfunctional as one can very easily 
miss the forest for the trees. If no, the pursuit of a general synthesis may be ne-
cessary for what Piaget called equilibration and value coordination, instead of 
just being a waste of time and an exercise in confusion and self-deception. 
The solution of problems is generally agreed to be the hallmark of in-
telligent behavior. But how ought we to define the concept of a problem? What 
are the kinds of problems General Philosophy ought to solve? What is the concept 
of a solution or answer? What is a concept? If General Philosophy deals with the 
big questions, does it make sense to pursue such questions at all? Would it not 
be better to limit oneself to special cases of those big questions? What is the dif-
ference between conceptual and empirical problems?  
The expression ‘General Philosophy’ may seem redundant at first 
sight because Philosophy is usually thought to deal with big questions concer-
ning life, meaning, truth, justice, beauty, whereas scientists prefer to concentrate 
on narrower problems with a more empirical or quantitative orientation. Howe-
ver, contemporary academic philosophers also need to specialize in several sub-
fields such as Ethics, Epistemology, Aesthetics, or Philosophy of Language if they 
want to contribute to some current debate and earn their degrees. Academic Phi-
losophy has to deal with several significant issues: (a) it is inescapably embedded 








scientific communication; (b) it presupposes a monumental past that cannot be 
ignored without running the risk of unconsciously repeating it; (c) it mediates 
between Common Sense, Journalism, Science, Religion and Politics, which has 
led to the persecution and death of figures such as Socrates and Jesus. In the En-
glish-speaking world, the solution to issue (a) has required a major and ongoing 
effort of translation and editorial clarification of works mainly in French and Ger-
man (Continental) Philosophy. Whatever merits these works may have must be 
then rendered into and evaluated in English. To solve problem (b), History of 
Philosophy was established as a separate discipline and assigned the task of pre-
serving the past. Problem (c) was not really solved, but minimized by the promo-
tion of the analytical approach. By breaking down general issues into technical 
details a certain illusion of rigor could be introduced to contain uncontrolled dis-
cussion.   
For this reason, General Philosophy is not clearly defined and may be 
confused with introductory level material meant for an undergraduate course or 
even with Pop Philosophy for the layperson. Academically, General Philosophy 
is not an acceptable genre from the point of view of Analytic Philosophy. There-
fore, the solution to the problem of General Philosophy would be to simply de-
clare it extinct or non-existent. However, Piaget and Bunge noted that the inade-
quacy of this false solution lay in its lopsided denial of the cognitive, but also 
general psychological need for synthesis and systematization. Analysis and 
synthesis are complementary cognitive processes, but it would appear that pro-
ponents of Analytic Philosophy did not realize that the neglect of synthesis and 
context lessens the relevance of whatever results they may believe to have attai-
ned. To make their case that only analysis matters, Analytic philosophers needed 









Analytic Philosophy enabled its practitioners to bring some concep-
tual and logical clarity to doubts that most people recognize as being deep and 
philosophical. This is certainly an important and even indispensable skill. After 
B. Russell and L. Wittgenstein, linguistic analysis became a widely accepted me-
thod to approach philosophical problems. However, it is not and cannot be an 
exclusive property of analytic philosophers, but belongs to the general scientific 
community. Moreover, it has shown itself unable to achieve a sufficient consen-
sus on solutions to basic issues, which makes it aporetic. Part of the problem is 
that differences between a materialist, a dualist and a spiritualist cannot be over-
come by just attaining a clearer statement of their beliefs, for they also involve 
commitments to different values, which makes logical refutation ineffective even 
when it is indeed possible to a certain degree. Analytic Philosophy’s claim to 
have brought progress is legitimate only in that it raised our awareness of the 
extent to which deep-seated disagreements remain unsolvable.  
Dissatisfaction with Analytic Philosophy was already sufficiently high 
by the 1980s to lead philosophers increasingly towards interdisciplinary collabo-
ration. So-called “cognitive science” came about as a conversation involving the 
fields of Artificial Intelligence, Neuroscience, Anthropology, Linguistics, Psycho-
logy and Philosophy. Piaget had already pointed the way for this decades earlier 
when he created the Centre international d'épistémologie génétique at the University 
of Geneva in 1955 with support from the Rockefeller Foundation. However, the 
major problem for  Philosophy when it is “naturalized” or brought closer to sci-
entific research is that it tends to become a mere appendage to methodology as it 
belabors epistemological and ethical issues that scientists usually prefer to take 
for granted. B. Croce brilliantly described this situation in his Logic: 
[...] when it is only a question of classifying and systematizing those 








labours of the philosopher, indeed, he feels that he alone, who has ob-
tained the results, knows what these exactly are and how they should 
be treated in order to avoid deformation. And the philosopher, who by 
making himself an empiricist, a positivist, a psychologist and a neocri-
tic, has renounced his autonomy, approaches the scientists and offers 
with little dignity services that they refuse. He elaborates scientific ex-
positions, which they call compilations and mistakes, he proposes ad-
ditions or corrections at which they mock as superfluous or foolish. Ne-
vertheless, the philosopher does not grow weary nor becomes offended 
at these repulses and jests; he returns to the charge and indeed it is only 
when someone wishes to redeem him from this voluntary servitude 
and abjection that he turns upon him with fury, saying that philosophy 
should live on familiar terms with the sciences. As if the relations that 
we have faithfully described were relations of reciprocal respect and 
harmony! The truth is that the majority of empirical philosophers are 
failures in science and unsuccessful in philosophy… (CROCE, 1917, p. 
409-410) 
Indeed, in spite of the noteworthy contributions to cognitive science 
by philosophers such as Daniel Dennett in the US, Peter Hacker in the UK, and 
Arno Ros in Germany, Philosophy cannot be said to have overcome this subor-
dinate position. Unfortunately, a resentful affirmation of autonomy is not viable 
because, as Gilles Gaston Granger (GRANGER, 1988) argued following Kant and 
Wittgenstein, Philosophy lacks a definite concrete object, but deals with the way 
we approach objects in general. Moreover, in an interdisciplinary context, auto-
nomy is a dubious ideal to pursue. Actually, the issue of Philosophy’s subordi-
nation goes way back to medieval times (“Philosophy as a handmaiden of Theo-
logy”), but received its modern version in John Locke’s reference to himself as an 
“under-laborer” in the Epistle to the Reader of his Essay. What Woosuk Park 
(2018) describes as the “inadequately understood take-over” of Logic by Mathe-
matics touches on another, perhaps even more critical issue, which is Philoso-
phy’s loss of content and monopoly over argumentation. A common argument, 
often attributed to Aristotle, against the extinction of Philosophy is that by the 
very act of arguing against Philosophy one would be doing Philosophy, which 








does not belong anymore to Philosophy? What if all scientists become philoso-
phers because they also make use of argumentation and create concepts too (DE-
LEUZE, 1991)? What if Philosophy, after thousands of years, has become such a 
confused concept as to be utterly useless? Are we not confusing the concept of 
Philosophy with Philosophy as an object or activity? Do we now need Metaphi-
losophy (cf. CASTAÑEDA, 1980 and RESCHER, 2006) to clear this all up? 
A further difficulty exists for students at Latin American universities, 
where undergraduate courses are conceived as tracks with limited options for 
electives and migration to another course (say, from Philosophy to Sociology) 
requires retaking a grueling admission exam. When applying for an academic 
job, it is often required of candidates that they have earned at least both the Ba-
chelor’s and Doctoral (Ph. D.) degrees in the field. So a candidate who got his 
undergraduate degree in Sociology but has a Ph. D. in Philosophy may be consi-
dered unfit to apply for a job either as a Philosophy or a Sociology professor. Of 
course, decisions in hiring may vary considerably, but the issue is real because 
there are vested interests behind the advancement, power, and prestige of each 
science. Piaget himself described the tension he experienced between Philosophy 
and Psychology in French-speaking academic institutions. 
Philosophers with historical and cultural concerns such as Charles 
Taylor, A. MacIntyre, P., R. Rorty, R. Scruton, H. U. Gumbrecht, R. Brandom and 
others explored another available path towards Historiography, History of Ideas 
and Intellectual History (RORTY; SCHNEEWIND; SKINNER, 1984). Peter Hyl-
ton showed that Analytic Philosophy itself could benefit from realizing that it 
had a history. Croce, R. Collingwood, A. C. Danto, H. White, P. L. Gardiner and 
others had already contributed to this historical option in the English-speaking 








made for courses on History of Philosophy in Philosophy graduate programs be-
cause analytic philosophers deluded themselves into believing that they were 
doing cutting-edge research, regardless whether it received scientific recognition 
or not. Alasdair MacIntyre’s lecture “On Having Survived Academic Moral Phi-
losophy” conveys much of the damage caused by the analytic obsession.  From a 
Mexican perspective, Alejandro Tomasini Bassols rejects the idea that Analytic 
Philosophy must be conducted only in English3 and argues that  
[…] the great problem with bad Analytic Philosophy is its cultural ste-
rility, its lack of meaning, its ineffectiveness to affect in one way or ano-
ther the academic and extra-academic life of the society in which it is 
produced, its character as an esoteric discipline and as a socially exclu-
ding or segregationist game. (BASSOLS, p. 185, 2014, my translation)4  
This perhaps best sums up the frustration with Analytic Philosophy 
that led some, particularly R. Rorty, to speak of a “Postanalytic” Philosophy. But 
it is important to remain mindful of historical context and development. Analytic 
Philosophy emerged, as P. Hylton has shown, from a combination of a reaction 
against Hegelian Idealism and the promise of Mathematical Logic. As frustration 
with the limitations of linguistic analysis increased, the pendulum swung 
towards Post-Modernism, Post-Structuralism and other Post-isms as a way to sa-
tisfy the rekindled the interest in synthesis. But General and Continental Philo-
sophy did not cease to suffer from the problems that Piaget had already pointed 
out in the late 1960s because of the untenable pure a priori claims of Phenome-
nology and Philosophical Psychology. Like Croce, he realized that a properly di-
alectical understanding of the complementary relation between analysis and 
                                                 
3 A similar critique concerning the use of English in Latin American Social Science is made by Alcadipani 
(2017). 
4 In the original: “A mi modo de ver, el gran problema de la mala filosofía analítica es su esterilidad cultural, 
su carencia de sentido, su inefectividad para incidir de uno u otro modo en la vida académica y extra-
académica de la sociedad en que es producida, su carácter de disciplina esotérica y de juego social exclu-








synthesis could allow Philosophy to adapt and survive as Historiography. Ex-
treme elevation of either analysis or synthesis is bound to be harmful for any 
discipline. The historiographic turn allows us to add the temporal dimension to 
the linguistic aspect of thought and to break free from the illusion of a static atem-
poral conceptual framework within which one would have to discern ultimate 
truth. Charles Taylor argues that historiographical research helps us not only to 
distance ourselves from an oppressive established view, but to recover another 
one to take its place. 
But historical retrieval is not only important where you want to free 
yourself from some picture. It is very important to my thesis that even 
in this negative case, where you want to break loose, you need to un-
derstand the past in order to liberate yourself. But liberation is not the 
only possible motive. We may also find ourselves driven to earlier for-
mulations in order to restore a picture, or the practices it is meant to 
inform. (…) Or without seeking either outright rejection or straight res-
toral, we may be looking for a perspicuous reformulation for our time 
of some traditional doctrine, and this too may require that we go back. 
(RORTY; SCHNEEWIND; SKINNER, p. 22, 1984) 
This brings to mind the expression ‘rational reconstruction’, which has 
been widely adopted by authors as different as R. Carnap, H. Reichenbach, I. La-
katos, P. Lorenzen, W. Stegmüller and J. Habermas. Gregg Alan Davia (1998) at-
tempts to sketch a rational reconstruction of the concept of rational reconstruc-
tion within the perspective of Analytic Philosophy. He does well to underscore 
the descriptive-prescriptive dichotomy and the systematic-historical dichotomy. 
Both distinctions are indeed important for conceptual analysis. Concepts can be 
understood as verbal categorizing skills that vary synchronically as well as dia-
chronically. But a systematic (or synchronic) General Philosophy would require 
massive theoretical construction, which is at least distinct from, if not opposed to 
analytical rational reconstruction. The diachronic analysis and reconstruction of 








is much less risky than the sometimes confusing theoretical syntheses attempted 
by J. Habermas and P. Ricoeur.  
Yet another term that arises in more technical approaches to define the 
task of Philosophy is ‘meta-methodology’. The coining of this cacophonic word 
is justified by the need to define a register of discourse that talks about methods, 
given their multiplicity. Mark Bevir provides an example of how Political Science 
can appropriate Philosophy by treating it as meta-methodology.  
Meta-methodology is in many ways just another word for philosophy. 
The meta-methodology of political science is the philosophy of social 
science. More particularly, meta-methodology is the deliberate attempt 
to reflect theoretically about what methods are appropriate to the study 
of what aspects of politics and on what occasions. It is the attempt to 
clarify what kind of knowledge and what kind of explanations fit the 
kinds of objects that are the concern of political science. (BEVIR, p. 48, 
2008) 
Piaget admitted that no human being can be complete without at least 
a little Philosophy. Unfortunately, a painful trilemma arises because without 1) 
General Philosophy as a kind of superscience we lose a discipline that could al-
low us to develop a big picture of the universe. Current concerns about dysfunc-
tional specialization and the need for interdisciplinary coordination are justified 
and widely acknowledged because, in Piaget's theoretical terms, cognitive sche-
mata require integration (or synthesis) by what he called reciprocal assimilation. 
Under the definition proposed here, General Philosophy would be  equivalent to 
what is sometimes called General Studies and would produce good generalists. 
In case General Philosophy were definitively abandoned, there would be two 
other options: 2) philosophers would have to submit to the usual constraints of 
scientific specialization and content themselves with only thinking about detai-
led, not big questions, as is done in Analytical Philosophy; or 3) investigate how 








done in History of Ideas or Intellectual History. If, however, one insists on pur-
suing General Philosophy, it is not clear how such larger issues can be dealt with 
in a manner that goes beyond just rehashing generalities and wasting intellectual 
effort. So on the one hand it is important to widen the scope of our thought and 
to coordinate information, as Piaget acknowledged, but on the other hand 
without concern for conceptual detail General Philosophy loses academic credi-
bility. The main requirement for good generalism would be a combination of two 
apparently opposed cognitive abilities: to go beyond the narrow confines of a 
specialty but to be also able to focus on technical detail when needed.  
Piaget 
Although Piaget's interest throughout his life was predominantly 
epistemological, his status as a major developmental psychologist has oversha-
dowed his importance as a reformer of Philosophy. Piaget’s objections to the Phi-
losophy of his time are too numerous to be summarized here but it is possible 
and advisable to concentrate on two dimensions: the epistemological and the 
psycholinguistic. 
At the epistemological level, Piaget showed that sensorimotor sche-
mata led to the construction of mental object permanence and representational 
notions and symbols. During the pre-operational (or, as I prefer to call it, the se-
miotic) stage, as Michael Halliday (1975) showed, children develop their mea-
ning potential, learn how to mean and can start to use legitimate discursive con-
cepts as they begin to adopt socialized signs.  
Contrary to Kant’s view that time and space were a priori intuitions 
and that causality was a pure a priori category of the understanding, Piaget's re-
search suggested the view that time, space and causality could be all regarded as 








not innate. Kant had earlier distinguished between the pure a priori, which con-
tained the deeper categories of thought (such as quantity, quality, relation (cau-
sality), and modality), and the impure a priori, which comprised all concepts 
constructed empirically to deal with concrete things and most abstractions of so-
cial life (such as love, justice, etc.). It is also important to note that while truth 
pertains to propositions and validity to arguments, notions and concepts5 cannot 
be considered true or invalid, but are either legitimate or flawed. Regrettably, 
although probably aware of these distinctions, Piaget did not exploit them to 
their full potential, which led to some confusion concerning naturalizing Genetic 
Epistemology. Piaget realized correctly, however, that his results required that 
he strongly oppose apriorism and innatism/nativism, which he did.  
In particular, Piaget understood that if knowledge was to be unders-
tood organically, it had to develop in a dialectical process that dynamically ba-
lanced assimilation with accommodation. But cognitive development was not 
only something to be theorized about in the armchair as Descartes and Kant had 
done. It was not only possible, but incumbent upon theoreticians to relate their 
hypotheses to observable reality. Philosophy and Psychology must go hand in 
hand. Psychology without Philosophy would be methodologically naive. Philo-
sophy without Psychology would lose itself in speculation. This disconnect 
between theory and experience in Epistemology was dramatic, as it had led phi-
losophers not only to neglect development, but to believe in intuition as a means 
to achieve mystical insight into absolute reality. In his book on reconstructing 
Philosophy, J. Dewey described this untenable metaphysical view in a way that 
Piaget would have probably agreed with, although he was neither a Pragmatist 
nor a Positivist.  
                                                 
5 The traditional distinction, followed here, between notions and concepts is that the former are intuive or 









[…] Philosophy has arrogated to itself the office of demonstrating the 
existence of a transcendent, absolute or inner reality and of revealing to 
man the nature and features of this ultimate and higher reality. It has 
therefore claimed that it was in possession of a higher organ of knowle-
dge than is employed by positive science and ordinary practical expe-
rience, and that it is marked by a superior dignity and importance – a 
claim which is undeniable if philosophy leads man to proof and intui-
tion of a Reality beyond that open to day-by-day life and the special 
sciences. (DEWEY, p. 43, 1950) 
During the immediate post-war period, this metaphysical concept of 
Philosophy fell definitely out of favor and was substituted in the policies of in-
ternational organizations, such as the UNESCO, of whose International Bureau 
of Education (IBE) Piaget was Director from 1929 to 1968, for what Julian Huxley 
called a philosophy of evolutionary humanism with a political agenda geared 
towards world government. Under Huxley’s plan, UNESCO’s Philosophy sec-
tion would be assigned two basic tasks: criticism and synthesis.  
The section of Philosophy will no longer uphold the view (which du-
ring certain periods of history could be justified) that philosophy itself 
should embrace the whole of human knowledge, or that philosophers 
can arrive at results of value by pure cerebration or in solitude. On the 
contrary, it will work on the assumption that in the world of to-day 
philosophy has, broadly speaking, a twofold function. First the func-
tion of general criticism - criticism of the assumptions of the scientist, 
the artist, the mathematician, the political thinker, the man in the street; 
criticism of man’s methods of thinking in general, including the critical 
faculty itself; this does not involve the direct pursuit of new knowledge, 
although it may help to promote the advance of knowledge by impro-
ving the methods of knowing. And secondly the function of synthesis, 
of relating the findings of all other activities of the human mind, moral 
and aesthetic as well as intellectual, to each other and to philosophy’s 
critique, and distilling the product in unitary form. For both these func-
tions, philosophers must be in close contact with all other higher acti-
vities of man, both with the workers in the various branches and with 
their works. (HUXLEY, p. 39, 1949) 
This shows how Dewey, Huxley and Piaget, in spite of their differen-
ces, shared the conviction, sponsored by the Rockefeller Foundation, that inter-








could be expected, had a more sophisticated understanding of the implications 
of distinguishing, as F. de Saussure had done, between the synchronic and the 
diachronic perspectives and how they could throw light on each other. This led 
him to value the historico-critical method more highly for its potential theoretical 
insights than is perhaps usual in the English-speaking scientific world. 
After the distinguished studies of Cournot—whose true value has for 
so long been neglected—which dealt with the analysis of scientific 
thought in a somewhat synchronic perspective, a certain number of 
thinkers like G. Milhaud, L. Brunschvicg, P. Boutroux, and A. 
Reymond, have realized that the epistemological significance of a sci-
entific theory only fully shows itself when seen in its historical perspec-
tive. This is so because it answers the questions raised by earlier doctri-
nes and prepares the way for its successors by a network of relations-
hips that continue or contradict it. In other words, as scientific thought 
is continually developing, the problem of what knowledge is can only 
be resolved under the most limited forms, which tend to analyze the 
way in which knowledge grows or develops in the context of actual 
construction. From this results the historico-critical method, one of the 
most important methods of scientific epistemology. (PIAGET, p. 74, 
1972) 
A brilliant example of the use of the historico-critical method can be 
appreciated in J. Schumpeter’s (SCHUMPETER, p. 149, 1947) suggestion that 
“economic historians and economic theorists […] make an interesting and soci-
ally valuable journey together […],” which leads him to the important distinction 
between an adaptive response, in which an economic unit accommodates (to use 
Piaget's term) to conditions by increasing effort but maintaining standard proce-
dures, and a creative response, in which accommodation leads to social-economic 
change and requires a new point of equilibrium (Piaget's optimizing equilibra-
tion or équilibration majorante). 
At the psycholinguistic level, Piaget's rejection of apriorism and inna-
tism/nativism led to his critique of Phenomenology and philosophical Psycho-
logy in Insight and Illusions of Philosophy (1972). Piaget's fundamental point was 








single truth, but only a manifold of subjective “wisdoms” fueled by reflection 
(holology). The main reason for this is that there is no specific source of knowle-
dge (in other words, no pure a priori categories) available for philosophers to 
appeal to that could establish verifiable facts or arguments on their own. In Gilles 
Gaston Granger’s terms (GRANGER, 1988), Philosophy could at best be conside-
red a kind of “knowledge without an object”. Therefore, Piaget’s conclusions con-
cerning Philosophy are not particularly encouraging. 
Let us now return to philosophy, first noting that in many countries 
there is a marked increase in the number of philosophers as compared 
with earlier centuries when philosophy was not a profession but an ex-
ceptional achievement. It might be said that the same thing has happe-
ned with scientists. However, a mediocre scientist can still carry out 
useful work in a limited field, while an undistinguished philosopher is 
a little like an untalented artist or novelist. If then philosophy is concer-
ned with reality as a whole, it is assumed to be possible to train specia-
lists in this complete knowledge or search for the absolute, without 
their first having had some training in the field of partial or relative 
knowledge. It is true that they have acquired a sense [p. 169] of history 
and a respect for texts, since the only specialization demanded of them 
is the history of philosophy, but as far as methods of knowledge are 
concerned, only reflection is used, which, moreover, corresponds to the 
deep-rooted tendencies of adolescence and the natural inclination of 
the human mind. Hence, when they have not the exceptional courage 
to specialize in the epistemology of a particular science and to advance 
knowledge of the latter, (...) the studies engaged in by philosophers are 
either historical, or reflective in the most general sense. In such a situa-
tion, the knowledge of facts is divorced from that which alone can give 
it the character of knowledge properly so called, that is to say, from an 
inquiry into its technicality. There is therefore a strong temptation, mo-
reover, under an unconscious or implicit form, to assume that reflection 
on fact is, in this case, subsequent and not prior to the establishment of 
fact (since, in the event, the latter has already in general been esta-
blished by others), that it is of a higher order than the latter and conse-
quently can intervene actively in the interpretation of fact, rectifying 
and completing it where necessary. (PIAGET, p. 168-9, 1972) 
The takeaway is that, because of its normative nature, Philosophy can-
not be a matter of truth or falsehood, but only of judgment (as to what is better 
or legitimate for a given cognitive need). In addition, it cannot deal with verifia-








wanted to specialize in a particular science, or to become writers of novels (ro-
manciers), popular science, or history of science. This ultimatum was generally 
dismissed by the philosophical community and has been barely ever mentioned 
thereafter, although his critique could be considered vindicated to some extent 
and a stubborn denial of these difficulties is bound to be more harmful than be-
neficial. It is also worth noting that Piaget's view was genuinely encyclopedic and 
arguably superior to that of both Heidegger and Wittgenstein for its (in principle 
updatable) articulation with formal, natural and social sciences, as displayed in 
his short book on Structuralism (1970).  
Bunge 
Bunge’s outstanding contribution can be considered as a good model 
for General Philosophy because it combines systematic organization with 
analytic detail. Therefore, it could serve as a counter-example, against Piaget, to 
support the position that General Philosophy is still a viable and defensible pur-
suit.  
In the General Preface to his Treatise, Bunge presents his balanced view 
of how analysis and synthesis should be articulated in a systematic constructive 
process. 
Now a word of apology for attempting to build a system of basic phi-
losophy. As we are supposed to live in the age of analysis, it may well 
be wondered whether there is any room left, except in the cemeteries of 
ideas, for philosophical syntheses. The author's opinion is that analysis, 
though necessary, is insufficient - except of course for destruction. The 
ultimate goal of theoretical research, be it in philosophy, science, or ma-
thematics, is the construction of systems, i.e. theories. Moreover these 
theories should be articulated into systems rather than being disjoint, 
let alone mutually at odds. (BUNGE, p. v, 1974) 
This systemism (or systemic approach) allows Bunge not only to over-
come the dichotomy between analysis and synthesis at the methodological level, 








This is not possible for isolationist approaches, such as Heidegger’s and 
Wittgenstein’s, that advocate the autonomy of Philosophy in relation to Science. 
Systemism also informs Bunge’s attitude towards identifying problems to be sol-
ved. 
To engage in research of any kind is to work on a problem or a cluster 
of problems of some kind — cognitive, technological, social, artistic, or 
moral. In imitation of John’s gospel, we may say that in the beginning 
was the problem. So, those wishing to start doing science must find or 
invent a problem to work on, as well as a mentor willing to guide them. 
(BUNGE, p. 1, 2016) 
Bunge engages in fruitful dialogue with the sciences by raising awa-
reness of the implications of their often unconscious assumptions. In this way, he 
argues that latent views of idealistic and phenomenalistic inspiration can be 
shown to be harmful for those interested in an objective approach to reality. Phi-
losophy’s role is best carried out in clarifying scientific hypotheses. 
Aurora Journal of Philosophy – (…) what would be the role of philoso-
phical work and what type of Philosophy should we pursue, if it still 
has an important role? 
Mario Bunge – I believe that it will always have an important role. Phi-
losophical hypotheses must be made known because scientists do not 
do it. When they present their ideas and their experimental results, they 
do not usually mention specifically the philosophical hypotheses that 
were useful to imagine either those ideas or the experimental designs. 
However, Philosophy is present in every scientific activity, and that is 
precisely the philosopher’s task: to bring to light the philosophical 
hypotheses, which for me are realism, materialism and systemism. That 
is to say that everything in the universe is a system or part of a system; 
there are neither isolated facts, nor isolated properties. (BUNGE, p. 333, 
2017, my translation)6 
                                                 
6 In the original: “Revista Filosofia Aurora – (...) qual seria o papel para o trabalho filosófico e que tipo de 
filosofia deveríamos fazer, se ainda ela possui um papel importante? Mario Bunge - Eu acredito que ela 
sempre vai ter um papel importante. As hipóteses filosóficas devem ser conhecidas porque os cientistas 
não o fazem. Quando expõem suas ideias e seus resultados experimentais não costumam mencionar espe-
cificamente as hipóteses filosóficas que foram úteis tanto para imaginar essas ideias como para imaginar 
desenhos de experimentos. Porém, a filosofia está presente em toda a atividade científica, e essa é justa-
mente uma tarefa do filósofo: sacar à luz as hipóteses filosóficas, que para mim são o realismo, o materia-
lismo, o sistemismo. É dizer que tudo no universo é um sistema ou uma parte do sistema; não há fatos 








By distinguishing strictly between a knowable, independently existing 
reality and egocentric imagination, Bunge avoids reflective quasi-autistic illusi-
ons Piaget was concerned about and opens the way for profitable cooperation 
between Science and Philosophy. His proposal is that philosophers excavate the 
foundations of Science and bring their merits and errors to light. He also advoca-
tes that Philosophy be judged by its ability to further scientific inquiry.   
Last but not least, his humanitarian concerns for social, economic and 
political development are territorialized7 and tightly bound to a critical asses-
sment of policies by their real outcomes. In particular, he lauded the efforts of 
Latin American philosophers in the Prologue to the Spanish edition of his Trea-
tise. 
Philosophy has developed vigorously in Spain and Latin America du-
ring the last decades. It has grown to the point that we already have 
little to learn from German Philosophy, which is still recovering from 
the disaster of 1933, and even less from French Philosophy, which for 
more than a century is dragging behind the German rearguard. (…) In 
our countries there are literally thousands of Philosophy professors and 
dozens of original investigators. Most of them are up to date in the in-
ternational philosophical literature and a few write books and articles 
that contain new contributions to Philosophy. There are several natio-
nal philosophical societies and dozens of philosophical journals, some 
of them bilingual or even trilingual, among them at least six at a good 
level. There are also national and international congresses of Philoso-
phy. / All of these new events took place in the last decades. They allow 
us to assert that not only is there Philosophy in Spain and Latin Ame-
rica, but that there is now a Latin American Philosophy that is original 
and not less important than the German, Italian or French. This novelty 
is reason for legitimate pride for all those who, in one way or another, 
contributed to build this Philosophy and, most particularly, for those 
who have done this under difficult material and political conditions. 
(BUNGE, p. 19-20, 2008, my translation)8 
                                                 
7 I use the term ‘territorialization’, which is different from Deleuze’s & Guatari’s distinction between deter-
ritorialization and reterritorialization because it does not make sense to say that Bunge “re-territorialized” 
or repatriated an Analytic Philosophy that was not previously available in Latin America. 
8 In the original: “La filosofía se ha desarrollado vigorosamente en España y en Hispanoamérica en el curso 
de las últimas décadas. Se ha desarrollado al punto de que ya tenemos poco que aprender de la filosofía 
alemana, la que aún se está recuperando del desastre de 1933, y menos todavía de la filosofía francesa, que 








It is generally agreed that the environment for Philosophy in Latin 
America depends on the state of democracy and religion9. A fact-based asses-
sment of the current situation would require a sociological study that goes be-
yond the scope and purpose of this metaphilosophical essay. However, a few 
comments are in order here. The creation of Philosophy courses at Latin Ameri-
can universities does not require high costs associated to cutting-edge research 
laboratories typical of experimental and applied Science. Although Philosophy 
cannot produce scientific results, as J. Huxley noted above, it shares the probing 
critical spirit of Science and is indispensable for a democratic society. Arantes 
(1994) provides a vivid account of the Brazilian 1960s Marxist philosophical en-
vironment at the University of São Paulo, strongly influenced by French profes-
sors such as Jean Maugüé, Victor Goldschmidt, Martial Gueroult, Gérard Lebrun, 
Michel Debrun and others. Yves de la Taille also sees a role for Philosophy also 
in secondary education to promote the development of moral judgment. 
The study of Philosophy can help, and a lot, […] - provided, of course, 
that it does not reduce itself to mere exchanges of personal opinions. 
However, Philosophy goes farther than that, for it consists of an under-
taking to decide how one will live and coexist. It follows from what I 
have just said that classes in Philosophy are directly related to moral 
education and, in particular, to the education of moral judgment, not 
                                                 
hay literalmente miles de profesores de filosofía y algunas decenas de investigadores originales. Muchos 
de ellos están al día en la literatura filosófica internacional y algunos escriben libros o artículos que conti-
enen aportes nuevos a la filosofía. Hay diversas sociedades nacionales de filosofía y docenas de revistas 
filosóficas, algunas de ellas bilingües o aun trilingües, entre ellas por lo menos seis de buen nivel. También 
hay congresos nacionales e internacionales de filosofía. / Todos estos son hechos nuevos ocurridos en el 
curso de las últimas décadas. Ellos nos permiten afirmar no solo que hay filosofía en España y en Hispa-
noamérica, sino que hay hoy una filosofía hispanoamericana original no menos importante que la ale-
mana, la italiana o la francesa. Esta novedad es motivo de legítimo orgullo para todos quienes, de una 
manera u otra, han contribuido a construir esta filosofía y, muy particularmente, para quienes lo han hecho 
en condiciones materiales y políticas difíciles.” 
9 In his encyclical Fides et ratio (Faith and Reason, 1998), Pope John Paul II addresses the general loss of 
confidence in human reason in 20th century Philosophy and renews the claim of the Catholic Church to 
divine wisdom and transcendent truth. However, a satisfactory combination of faith and reason does not 
seem to have been achieved yet at the societal level. Reason tends to reject supernatural explanations, 
leaving little or no room for faith. The improbability or even impossibility of divine intervention leaves 
humans to their own devices and favors pessimism. Faith can be (mis)placed in humanity, but by treating 
ourselves as gods any person can nullify what is sacred. Validation of the sacred seems to require a non-








only because the study of the love for wisdom helps us to think well, 
but also because it allows us to approach the theme of morality in a 
deep way, given that the majority of the great philosophers devoted 
themselves to it. (LA TAILLE, p. 243, 2009, my translation)10 
In spite of the recognition of the social-political role of Philosophy, the 
difficulties pointed out by Piaget from the scientific perspective remain and 
should not be forgotten. Undergraduate courses in Philosophy at most Latin 
American universities are still far from preparing students for the challenges of 
the 21st Century, with its strong emphasis on Applied Science. Given the typical 
profile of Philosophy students, a thorough training in methods of historical rese-
arch would be appropriate and would probably be well received by them. Ano-
ther problem is that most institutes and faculties are misnamed ‘Institute of Phi-
losophy and Human Sciences,’ while they should be renamed and rearranged as 
institutes and faculties of History and Human Sciences,11 with “Philosophy” pla-
ced under the umbrella of History. Logic is a formal science and should be pro-
perly welcomed among its mathematical peers. Moreover, Bunge’s General Phi-
losophy may be too ambitious and hence not  advisable for young philosophers 
to follow as a model. Bunge’s case may be an exception that indirectly points to 
General Philosophy’s impracticality rather than the contrary. And the harmful 
confusion about what exactly the discipline is supposed to do seems unsolvable. 
The relative lack of general philosophers who can be taken as an example to fol-
low is also discouraging. All in all, the proliferation in the use of the term ‘Sci-
ence’ has made term ‘Philosophy’ obsolete and unhelpful. 
                                                 
10 In the original: “O estudo da Filosofia pode ajudar, e muito, (...) – contanto, é claro, que não se reduza a 
trocas descompromissadas de opiniões pessoais. Porém, a Filosofia vai além, por se tratar de uma emprei-
tada para se decidir como se vai viver e conviver. Decorre do que acabo de afirmar que aulas de Filosofia 
relacionam-se diretamente com a educação moral e, em particular, com a educação do juízo moral, não 
somente porque o estudo do amor à sabedoria ajuda a pensar bem, mas também porque permite abordar 
de forma profunda o tema da moralidade, uma vez que a maioria dos grandes filósofos se dedicou a ele.” 
11 With his Sociobiology, E.O. Wilson reminds us that the Social Sciences in principle also include non-hu-
man species, so it would be proper to specify that we are talking about Human Social Sciences. To keep 
things short, it would be better to use the expression ‘Human Sciences’, because there are no “Individual 









Does this spell the end of General Philosophy? Unfortunately it does, 
if General Philosophy is conceived as an autonomous subject that could ignore 
Science (what Piaget called a “para-scientific” view). A non-scientific General 
Philosophy, as practiced in Continental Philosophy, often in combination with 
Psychoanalysis, is in principle possible as a discursive genre, but not advisable 
because it inevitably runs into a collision course with the Social Sciences.  Deleuze 
admits that, “If there is place and time to create concepts, the operation by which 
they are made will be always called Philosophy, or one would not even distin-
guish it at all if one gave it another name.”12 (DELEUZE, p.14, 1991, my transla-
tion). The problem here is that according to the academic division of labor, the 
Social Sciences de facto take possession of the fragments of reality they investigate 
and the concepts used to describe them. Social scientists have a legitimate claim 
to be considered philosophers because they also reflect on and revise their con-
cepts. Aware of this, Deleuze rejects self-knowledge, contemplation, reflection 
and communication as specifically philosophical tasks. Deprived of its content, 
pure Philosophy becomes an empty shell, while Science is progressively enriched 
as scientists reflect on their own conceptual frameworks. But as a form of “kno-
wledge without an object” (Granger), at the end of this process Philosophy finds 
itself just like the loser in the game of musical chairs: standing and helpless, 
without anything to do. All scientists can claim to be philosophers, but philoso-
phers cannot claim to be scientists unless they follow Piaget’s advice to do further 
work and commit themselves to researching a fragment of reality. Philosophy is 
not a Pseudoscience, but rather a Parascience. In the same way that Latin it is not 
strictly dead, but lives on in the Romance languages, Philosophy survives in Sci-
ence as a discursive genre that articulates theory and empirical verification. It 
                                                 
12 In the original: “S'il y a lieu et temps de créer des concepts, l'opération qui y procède s'appellera toujours 








becomes rather an attitude, like the love of truth (Philalethia), than an autono-
mous discipline with specific content. 
Analytic Philosophy avoids embarrassment by not indulging in trans-
versal speculation and protects itself from banalization by deploying sophistica-
ted critical and logical skills. This is fine because even if one is a genius, it still 
remains advisable to tackle problems that can be broken down into manageable 
parts and then try to reassemble them into a coherent whole. If analysis precedes 
synthesis, less confusion will ensue. But conceptual analysis is part and parcel of 
the scientific method. A historiographer cannot study the history of the concept 
of work without providing at least a preliminary definition. This leaves Analytic 
Philosophy in the condition of a Protoscience or a truncated Half-Science (Me-
thodology and Epistemology). 
It may be urged that the discussion of general concepts and problems 
remains to some degree not only socially but also intellectually necessary and 
unavoidable, provided that it maintain its connection to current scientific rese-
arch and its commitment to objectivity. This is indeed reasonable, but cannot be 
undertaken as a task for academic Philosophy, as it is now performed by journa-
lists and social commentators on the internet.  
The unsatisfactory conclusion is hence that General Philosophy be-
came academically unpromising but not wholly eliminable from intellectual life, 
and must coexist with Science in a hybrid or symbiotic form unless it wants to 
deteriorate into quasi-autistic reflection (holology) and banal ideology. In the 
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